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Abstract
A theory is developed that explains how the stock market can crash in
the absence of news about fundamentals, and why crashes are more common
than frenzies. A crash occurs via the interaction of rational and naive in-
vestors. Naive traders believe in a simple (but reasonable) statistical model
of stock prices: that prices follow a random walk with serially correlated
volatility. They predict future volatility adaptively, as a weighted average
of past squared price changes. We assume an initial round of trading that
establishes a baseline price for the stock. In the next round, the price either
remains near the baseline level or, with a small probability, "crashes" to a
lower level. If the price crashes, the naive traders lower their demand in
response to the apparent increase in volatility. This lowers the risk bear-
ing capacity of the market, so that the lower crash price clears the market.
Unlike other explanations of market crashes, this mechanism is fundamen-
tally asymmetric: the stock price cannot rise sharply, so frenzies or bubbles
cannot occur.
Keywords: Stock market crashes, adaptive expectations.
11 Introduction
On October 19, 1987, the S&P 500 index fell by 20.5%. Evidence from option prices
suggests that investors expect more crashes to occur (e.g., Ait-Sahalia, Yared, and Wang
[2]). What causes such jumps in prices? The explanation should reﬂect the fact that
many traders were responding to the price declines themselves, rather than to news
about the economy or ﬁrm proﬁtability. According to Shiller’s postcrash survey [46, p.
386], declining prices on October 14-16 and the morning of October 19 were the news
items that most inﬂuenced investors’ views of the stock market on October 19, 1987 (See
also Cutler, Poterba, and Summers [14] and Shiller [46, pp. 373-4]).
The theory should also explain why crashes happen more often than comparable-
sized frenzies, in which prices rise sharply. Nine out of the ten largest one-day price
movements in the postwar period were declines (Hong and Stein [27]). Since 1945, the
S&P Composite index has fallen by 5% or more on 13 separate days; the average of
these declines was 7.5%. The index has risen by over 5% on only 5 days; the average
was only 5.9%.
We present a new theory in which a crash results from the interaction between
rational and naive traders. The naive traders believe that stock prices follow a random
walk with serially correlated volatility. (“Volatility” refers to the variance of the change
in stock prices.) They predict future volatility adaptively, as a weighted average of
recent squared price changes. This contrasts with the rational traders, who predict
future volatility correctly using knowledge of other players’ strategies.
The naive traders’ model for predicting future volatility lies in the family of Au-
toregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models proposed by Engle [17] and
Bollerslev [8]. These models have become the dominant approach to modelling changing
volatility in econometric analysis of asset markets. Our model appears to be the ﬁrst
to explore how equilibrium prices are aﬀected if some agents use this common type of
model to predict future return volatility.
There is some historical justiﬁcation for the idea that the presence of naive traders
makes crashes more likely. The largest crashes, in 1929 and 1987, occurred after ex-
2tended bull markets that attracted many inexperienced investors into the stock market.
The investor Bernard Baruch wrote, in reference to the crash of 1929,
Never before had there been such gambling as there was in those last turbu-
lent years of the twenties; but few people realized they were gambling–they
thought they had a sure thing. ... Taxi drivers told you what to buy. The
shoeshine boy could give you a summary of the day’s ﬁn a n c i a ln e w sa sh e
worked with rag and polish. (Baruch [6, pp. 219-220])
In our model, a crash occurs in the following way. The rational traders observe a
common signal that acts as a coordinating device. For certain values of this signal,
they lower the price they bid for stocks, causing the stock price to fall. The sharp
price change raises the naive traders’ assessment of the risk in the market. Since naive
traders are risk averse, they become less willing to own stocks. This lowers the market’s
risk-bearing capacity, so that a lower price clears the market. The crash is thus a
self-fulﬁlling prophecy for the rational traders.
Importantly, this mechanism does not give rise to frenzies. Suppose rational traders
were suddenly to raise their bid for stocks. The sharp price change would, once again,
raise the naive traders’ estimate of future volatility, lowering the market’s risk-bearing
capacity. Accordingly, there would be a surplus of stock at the higher price: the market
would not clear. This is consistent with the empirical rarity of frenzies.1
This model captures other stylized facts surrounding crashes. Prices jump discon-
tinuously. Some traders - the naive ones - sell in response to the falling price. In
addition, crashes are unexpected: until the crash signal is observed, no one knows a
crash is about to happen. This mirrors ﬁndings of Bates [7] that option prices indicated
no crash fears in the 2 months leading up to the 1987 crash.
1Naive traders in the model believe that prices follow a random walk. Thus, they do not believe that
price increases will be followed by more increases. If they did believe this (à la the feedback traders of
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman [16]), frenzies might occur. However, the mechanism we
describe would still reduce the sizeso ff r e n z i e sr e l a t i v et oc r a s h e s .
3The presence of naive traders is necessary for crashes to occur in our model. If
there were only rational agents, they would know that the crash was a transitory event
and would thus prevent the crash by bidding prices up on the crash day. But while
some naivete is needed for a crash to occur, it takes a very mild form: naive traders
believe that stock prices follow a random walk with serially correlated volatility. Until
recent years, this was a widespread belief among economists (e.g., Bachelier [3], Fama
[18], Malkiel [39], Mandelbrot [40]).
In our theory, naive traders fare worse than rational traders. However, the usual
criticism is not valid that naive traders cannot play a role in price dynamics since they
will eventually be driven from the market. This is because crashes are rare. Most of
the investors in the market during the 1987 crash had not been born in 1929.
In the model, the rational traders sell in response to a common signal that acts as
a coordinating device. What played this role in 1987? On the morning of the crash
on October 19, 1987, the Wall Street Journal published a chart suggesting a similarity
between recent market action and stock prices in 1929. This chart, which is discussed
by Shiller [47], is reproduced in Figure 1.
Figure 1:
This similarity is more than just casual. On the eve of the 1987 crash, the recent
4behavior of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) was more similar to its behavior
on the eve of the 1929 crash than at any Friday between the two dates. More precisely,
we computed charts of the closing Dow Jones Industrial Average, in logs, over the 100
trading days ending on each Friday from 1930 through 1987. (We restrict to Fridays
since both crashes occurred on a Monday.) We superimposed each of these charts on
the corresponding chart for the Friday that preceded the 1929 crash. We then computed
the area between the two curves. This area was smaller on the Friday preceding the
1987 crash than on any prior Friday in the 1930-1987 period.2 These two curves are
depicted in Figure 2.
This parallel was noticed independently by other investors. Stanley Druckenmiller,
then manager of George Soros’s Quantum Fund, states:
That Friday [October 16, 1987] after the close, I happened to speak to Soros.
He said that he had a study done by Paul Tudor Jones that he wanted to
show me. [...] The analysis [...] illustrated the extremely close correlation in
price action between the 1987 stock market and the 1929 stock market, with
the implicit conclusion that we were now at the brink of a collapse [emphasis
added]. I was sick to my stomach when I went home that evening. I realized
that I had blown it and that the market was about to crash. [44, pp. 198-9]
Shiller argues that such reliance on historical parallels is an example of the represen-
tativeness heuristic:
2Let Dt be the log closing DJIA on day t.L e t T be 10/25/1929, the Friday preceding the 1929
crash. The minimum area between the 100-day charts ending on days t and T is given by At =
minx
P99
i=0 |Dt−i − DT−i − x|. At is minimized by setting x to the diﬀerence between the medians of
the two series. We measure At for t equal to each Friday from 1930 to 1987. The smallest At is 2.29
and occurred on the Friday that preceded the 1987 crash (10/16/1987). The next smallest, 2.53,w a s
reached the prior Friday (10/9/1987). The average value of At from 1930 to 1987 (Fridays only) is 5.76
and the maximum is 23.38. (The New York Stock Exchange was open for two hours in the morning
on Saturdays until 1952. In order to ensure a consistent relation between trading days and calendar
time, we omit these Saturday index levels from our analysis.)
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Figure 2: Closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Index, in logs, for the 100 trading
days ending the Fridays before the 1929 and 1987 crashes. The crash occurred on the
following Monday in both cases. The median of each series is subtracted in order to
minimize the area between the curves.
6a tendency for people to categorize events as typical or representative of a
well-known class, and then, in making probability estimates, to overstress
the importance of such a categorization, disregarding evidence about the
underlying probabilities. (Shiller [47, p. 22])
This heuristic was ﬁrst identiﬁed by Kahneman and Tversky [31, p. 431]. It has also
been cited as an explanation for stock market overreaction to news (Barberis, Shleifer,
and Vishny [4]; De Bondt and Thaler [15]). Early experimental evidence that decision
makers use this heuristic appears in Kahneman and Tversky [32], Grether [24], and
Johnson [30].
Camerer [10] documents the use of the representativeness heuristic in asset markets.
In his experiment, subjects are shown an urn that contains three balls. With some prior
probability, one ball is black and two are red. With complementary probability, two
balls are black and one is red. Subjects know these prior probabilities. Three balls
are drawn with replacement from the urn and are shown to the subjects. Subjects then
trade in assets whose payoﬀs depend on the numbers of black and red balls in the urn.
Camerer’s subjects appear to overestimate the probability that the actual distribution
equals the sample distribution. For instance, if two sampled balls are black, then
subjects tend to overvalue assets that pay oﬀ when the urn contains exactly two black
balls.
Why is the representativeness heuristic used? One possible answer comes from
Gilboa and Schmeidler [22, 23]. They study "case-based decision making": the practice
of choosing among possible actions by considering how they have performed in similar
situations in the past. Gilboa and Schmeidler suggest that this practice may be a
reasonable way to copy with complex situations.3 Our theory gives another context in
which the heuristic may be useful: it may serve as a coordinating device. This would
provide an additional reason for individual agents to use it in some strategic settings.
3While both theories predict that agents will choose actions that have performed well in similar
situations, case-based decision theory is not the same as the representativeness heuristic. For instance,
while the representativeness heuristic involves underweighting of priors, in case-based decision theory
there are no priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler [22]).
7The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Relevant literature is reviewed in
section 2. Section 3 explains the naive traders’ beliefs. The model is presented in
section 4 and solved in section 5.
2 Literature Review
Explaining crashes is a central problem in economics. Occasional crashes are an essential
feature of the aggregate stock market in modern times and appear to be crucial for
understanding the empirical patterns of option prices (e.g., Ait-Sahalia, Yared, and
Wang [2]). A satisfactory model of crashes should generate asymmetric price jumps
from little or no fundamental news. By and large, prior models of crashes do not yield
this phenomenon.
One group of models studies how crashes can occur if small changes in the environ-
ment lead substantial information to be revealed to partially informed investors. This
class of models includes Abreu and Brunnermeier [1], Caplin and Leahy [12], Hong and
Stein [27], Kraus and Smith [34], Lee [35], Romer [43], and Zeira [50]. While these
models yield price jumps with little or no fundamental news, they generally do not yield
t h ep r e d i c t i o nt h a tc r a s h e sa r em o r ec o m m o n than frenzies. However, there are two
exceptions. In Abreu and Brunnermeier, negative skew is generated by the assumption
that investors overestimate the dividend growth rate. If investors were to underesti-
mate this rate, the skew would be positive. In Hong and Stein, negative skew comes
from short-sale constraints. If these were replaced with margin constraints on leveraged
buying, crashes would be replaced by frenzies. In our model, negative skew is generated
by risk aversion. If naive investors were risk-loving, there would be frenzies instead of
crashes.
The models of Gennotte and Leland [21], Grossman [25], and Jacklin, Kleidon, and
Pﬂeiderer [28], explore how rational investors can mistake the informational content
of the trades of nonrational investors. These models assume the existence of portfolio
insurers, who mechanically sell stocks when prices fall and buy when they rise. If rational
traders underestimate the extent of this behavior, they will mistake it for informed
8trading. This can magnify the price eﬀects of minor news. The ﬁrst two papers
interpret the crash as coming from such a mistake. Jacklin et al interpret the price
increase before the crash as coming from underestimation of portfolio insurance, while
the crash itself occurred when informed traders realized their mistake. These models
do not generate skewed returns: crashes and frenzies are equally likely. In addition, in
most of these models, the crash is caused by a misinterpretation by rational investors.
One would expect prices to recover quickly as this confusion is cleared up. In practice,
prices returned to precrash levels only a year after the 1987 crash. According to our
theory, prices can remain low if naive investors remain “crashophobic” after the crash.
Evidence from option prices indicates that crash fears have been present in the years
since 1987 but were not present before the crash (Jackwerth and Rubinstein [29]).
Two other models of crashes are Barlevy and Veronesi [5] and Yuan [49], in which
all investors are rational and some are uninformed. A price decline signals negative
information to the uninformed investors, which lowers the price further, which signals
the possibility of even worse information, and so on. These models share the property
that crashes and frenzies can occur without assuming irrational or mistaken investors.
In Barlevy and Veronesi [5], this is due to nonstandard assumptions about the signal
distribution. In Yuan [49], it is due to borrowing constraints. Both papers ﬁnd that the
stock price can depend discontinuously on fundamentals. However, like Gennotte and
Leland [21], both of these are static, one period models and thus do not bear directly
on the asymmetry of changes in price.
The model of Grossman and Zhou [26], while not aimed at explaining crashes, does
yield some of their properties. They study a model with symmetric information and two
types of risk averse investors who each maximize expected consumption utility. One
type, the “portfolio insurers,” have an additional constraint that their wealth must not
fall below a certain level. As fundamentals worsen, the portfolio insurers sell stock at
an accelerating rate, leading to an increase in volatility. This model does not yield
news-free price jumps.
Our theory is related to the “volatility feedback” eﬀect ﬁrst studied by French, Schw-
ert, and Stambaugh [20], Malkiel [38] and Pindyck [41]. They point out that greater
9stock market volatility can lead to a higher risk premium and thus to lower stock prices.4
Campbell and Hentschel [11] show that this eﬀect can also give rise to negative skew:
price declines are larger, on average, than price advances. They assume a fully rational
representative agent who sees dividends that follow a process with serially correlated
volatility. Large dividend shocks lead to lower prices since they indicate an increase in
volatility and the agent is risk averse. This “volatility feedback eﬀect” dampens the
price eﬀects of positive dividend news and exaggerates the price eﬀects of negative news.
While the model of Campbell and Hentschel generates negative skew, it does not
give news-free jumps: prices are a continuous function of fundamentals. In their
calibrated model, the crash of 1987 results from a substantial negative dividend shock.
This is inconsistent with the evidence, cited above, that this crash was not caused by
any fundamental news that was revealed around the crash date (Shiller [46, pp. 373-4,
386]; Cutler, Poterba, and Summers [14]). One point of our model is that if risk-averse
traders believe that prices display serially correlated volatility, then their presence in
the market can yield news-free crashes without frenzies.
3 Naive Traders’ Beliefs
T h en a i v et r a d e r si no u rm o d e lb e l i e v et h a tl a r g ep r i c ec h a n g e st e n dt ob ef o l l o w e d
by more large changes: that price volatility is serially correlated. This has been the
dominant view among academic researchers since Mandelbrot [40, pp. 418-9] and Fama
[18, pp. 85-7]. It has reached a broader audience through popular textbooks such as
Brealey and Myers [9, p. 510] and Sharpe [45].
This view also underlies many econometric studies of asset prices. In 1982, Engle
[17] ﬁrst proposed the ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model, in
which next period’s volatility is a weighted sum of past realized volatilities. In 1986,
Bollerslev [8] generalized this to GARCH (Generalized ARCH) by letting next period’s
4In response to Pindyck [41], Poterba and Summers [42] produced evidence that volatility changes are
not persistent enough to eﬀect stock prices much. They model volatility as an AR(1) process. However,
Chou [13] subsequently found much stronger persistence using GARCH, a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation.
10volatility depend also on past predicted volatilities. In the past two decades, over 200
journal articles have used ARCH or GARCH to model the changing volatility of asset
returns.5 Our naive traders use a restricted GARCH model to predict future volatility.
We also assume naive traders believe that prices follow a random walk or, more
precisely, a Martingale. This view has been widely promulgated in textbooks and the
popular literature. In his best-selling textbook, Sharpe [45, p. 315] writes:
Stock returns exhibit almost no serial correlation: the particular value of
return in the last period provides little if any help in predicting the likelihood
of various possible returns in the next period.
Malkiel makes the same point forcefully in his well-known book AR a n d o mW a l kD o w n
Wall Street [39]. The view that price changes are unpredictable dates from Bachelier
[3].
To ﬁrst order, the market behaves in accordance with naive traders’ beliefs. For the
S&P Composite Index from 1929 to 1999, the serial correlation of daily return volatility
was 0.23; in comparison, the serial correlation of daily returns was only 0.055.6 For
the Dow Jones Industrial Average over the same period, the analogous ﬁgures were 0.22
and 0.052, respectively. Daily returns on S&P futures are essentially uncorrelated.7
These statistics support the view that stock prices follow a random walk with serially
correlated volatility.
Naive traders’ beliefs are as follows. Let pt b et h es t o c kp r i c ei np e r i o dt.N a i v e
traders believe that pt+1 will be normally distributed with mean pt and variance or
"volatility" Vt. They predict future volatility adaptively:
5Author’s tabulation from Econlit.
6These statistics are based on the usual deﬁnition of the ex-dividend return, rt =
pt−pt−1
pt−1 .T h e
serial correlation of returns is the sample correlation of rt with rt−1; the serial correlation of volatility
is the sample correlation of r2
t with r2
t−1.
7MacKinlay and Ramaswamy [37] compute daily autocorrelations in log returns for the S&P 500
index and for futures contracts on this index during the 1983-1987 period. They ﬁnd an average
autocorrelation of 6.04% for daily index returns versus -0.24% for daily futures returns.
11Vt = α(pt − pt−1)
2 + βVt−1 (1)
for some ﬁxed, positive constants α and β. By substituting repeatedly for V on the








where rt = pt − pt−1.
Equation (1) is a restricted GARCH(1,1) model. To see this, note that the unre-
stricted GARCH(1,1) model is
rt = γ + εt
E(ε
2
t)=Vt = ω + αr
2
t−1 + βVt−1
where rt is the return (Bollerslev [8]). The belief that prices follow a Martingale corre-
sponds to setting γ to zero. We also set ω and V0 to zero: as long as naive traders have
not seen any price changes, they do not expect them. Indeed, we will show that there
is an equilibrium in which the price is constant. Finally, for analytical convenience we
deﬁne rt to be the absolute price change pt − pt−1 rather than the log return.
4 The Model
T h eg a m et a k e sp l a c ei nt h r e ep e r i o d s : t =0 ,1,2. There is a measure μ of fully
rational traders and 1 − μ of naive traders. Agents consume only in period 2; they
maximize expected utility EU(W2)=E
£
−e−λW2¤
,w h e r eWt is wealth in period t and
λ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Note that agents are not myopic; both
types are forward looking. There are two assets: one (“stocks”), pays an i.i.d. dividend
δt ∼ N(δ,σ2
δ) per share8 after the market closes in each period t =0 ,1,a n daﬁxed
8The assumption of negative exponential utility and normally distributed dividends is common in
the theoretical ﬁnance literature. This is an advantage: it shows that crashes can be obtained in a
standard framework by adding a certain type of naive trader. The assumption that dividends are i.i.d.
12liquidating dividend of D in period 2. The other asset, bonds, is in inﬁnitely elastic
s u p p l ya n dp a y si n t e r e s ta taﬁxed net rate of r after the market closes in periods 0 and
1.
Let pt be the price of a share of stock in period t.I f a n a g e n t b u y s xt shares of stock
in period t =0 ,1, costing her ptxt, her wealth in period t +1is
Wt+1 = xt (pt+1 + δt)+( Wt − ptxt)(1 + r) (3)
T h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s .
Period 0. No signals are observed and all traders trade. The role of this period is to
permit optimal risk-sharing and to establish a base price p0 for the stock. At the
end of the period, the dividend δ0 per share is announced and distributed. The
naive traders’ prediction V0 of the variance of the initial price p0 is taken to be
zero.
Period 1. With probability ε, the rational traders all observe a crash signal; with prob-
ability 1 − ε, no signal is seen. The crash signal is a pure coordinating device.
All traders then trade at some price p1. Finally, the dividend δ1 is announced and
paid.
Period 2. The liquidating dividend D is paid. There is no trade in this period.
When trade takes place, naive agents simultaneously submit demand functions: the
quantity of shares they wish to buy at each price. Each rational trader submits a single
limit order of the form “I will buy x shares if the price per share is no greater than p.”
Since there is a continuum of agents, they will act as price takers.
By making limit orders, the rational traders collectively determine whether a crash
will occur by picking a particular point on their demand curves. This permits decen-
tralized crashes: many diﬀerent investors suddenly deciding to pay less for stock since
implies that there is no fundamental news that is relevant to the stock price. This stylized assumption
is made to show that crashes can occur without any fundamental news. Serially correlated dividend
shocks, while perhaps making the model more realistic, would obscure this point without essentially
changing the results.
13they predict that the price will be lower. If rational agents were instead to submit entire
demand curves, crashes would be centralized. They would take the form of a Walrasian
auctioneer’s occasionally choosing a low market-clearing price. The reason is that the
risky asset is liquidated in the next period with a ﬁxed payoﬀ distribution, so a rational
agent’s demand curve in period 1 is the same regardless of whether or not a crash signal
is seen. This is not the case with more trading periods. In Frankel [19] we analyze an
inﬁnite-horizon extension in which the crash signal leads rational agents to lower their
entire demand curves, which causes the crash to occur.
The model’s environment is nonstationary: there is a ﬁnite horizon and agents con-
sume only at the end of the game.9 To ensure the existence of a baseline equilibrium
with a constant stock price, we make two normalizations. The ﬁrst is to ﬁx the liqui-






. The second is to ﬁx the number of shares of stock
at 1
1+r in period zero and one in period 1. Why? Agents in period 1 face a one-period
problem with objective function e−λW2. But agents in period 0 invest as if they are
more risk averse. Their objective function is proportional to e−λ(1+r)W1:b y ( 3 ) , W2
equals W1(1 + r) plus a term that is independent of W1.10 As a result, stock demand
in any constant-price equilibrium must be lower in period 0 than in period 1. For the
price to be constant, the initial supply must also be lower.
We allow for the possibility of margin constraints: in every period, a trader can
buy no more than κ shares of stock, where κ ≥ 1. The case of no constraints can
be captured by setting κ = ∞. The main barrier to a crash is that rational traders
demand more stock when the price falls. The margin constraint tempers this eﬀect.
Indeed, we will show that crashes can occur as long as the margin constraint is tight
enough to prevent rational traders from buying all the stock in the market in period
1: if μκ < 1. Without margin constraints, crashes can still occur if there are enough
9The main advantage of the ﬁnite horizon formulation is that analytical results are possible. In
Frankel [19], we show by simulation that crashes can also occur in a stationary inﬁnite-horizon version
of the model.
10This is because the amount the agent invests in stock in period 1 does not depend on her wealth
W1.
14naive traders. Note that the margin constraint cannot bind for both groups of traders
in a given period. Otherwise, total stock demand would be μκ +( 1− μ)κ = κ,w h i c h
exceeds the supply.

















t are the time-t stock demands of rational and naive traders, respectively.
5R e s u l t s
We ﬁrst solve for investors’ stock demand functions. We will make use of the following
well known property. Proofs of all results are in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Suppose an agent has wealth W and the share price is p.T h e a g e n t b u y s
x shares of a risky asset that pays a gross return R in the next period and invests the
rest of her wealth in a riskless asset that pays the gross return 1+r.T h e r e i s a m a r g i n
constraint: x cannot exceed some constant κ. Let the agent’s wealth in the next period
be W0 = W(1 + r)+x(R − (1 + r)p). The agent seeks to maximize the expectation of
−e−λW0. Assume the agent believes that R ∼ N(μ,σ2). Then the agent’s unconstrained
stock demand is x∗ =
μ−(1+r)p
λσ2 .S h e w i l l b u y x =m i n {κ,x∗} shares and she believes that











− λW(1 + r)
i




2 κ2 − λ(μ − (1 + r)p)κ − λW(1 + r)
i
if x = κ
In period 1, each share yields the gross return D +δ1, which is normally distributed
with mean D +δ and variance σ2









15Note that rational traders demand more stock when the price falls.
Naive traders expect each share to yield the gross return p2 +δ1, which they believe
is normally distributed with mean p1 + δ and variance V1 + σ2
δ where V1 = α(p1 − p0)2.
(Recall our assumption that naive traders’ initial variance estimate V0 is zero.) By





λ(α(p1 − p0)2 + σ2
δ)
(7)
This equation is the key for understanding how crashes can occur. A falling price
in period 1 has two eﬀects. It raises the numerator: the higher dividend yield has a
positive eﬀect on naive demand, as in the case of rational traders. But it also raises
the denominator: declining prices raise naive traders’ estimate of future volatility, which
lowers their demand for stock. If this second, “volatility feedback” eﬀect dominates,
then naive traders’ demand for stock will be upwards sloping.
We now solve for demand in period 0. Naive traders expect each share to yield
the gross return p1 + δ0, which they believe is normally distributed with mean p0 + δ
and variance σ2
δ. By Lemma 1, their expected utility in period 1 is proportional to
exp(−λ(1 + r)W1),w h e r eW1 is period 1 wealth. Applying Lemma 1 with a risk








Rational traders’ demand in period 0 cannot be computed explicitly if p1 is not normally
distributed. However, we can compute it in a constant-price equilibrium, in which
p1 = p0 for sure. In this case, rational traders have the same beliefs as naive traders,








We ﬁrst show that there is only one constant-price equilibrium:
Proposition 2 T h e r ei so n l yo n ee q u i l i b r i u mi nw h i c ht h es a m ep r i c eo c c u r si np e r i o d s







16We call p the variance-free price. Proposition 3 shows that even in equilibria with
changing prices, the stock price can never exceed this fundamental level of p.T h u s ,
frenzies cannot occur in this model.
Proposition 3 In any equilibrium, the stock price can never exceed p.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. In a given equilibrium, let pmax be the
m a x i m u mp r i c et h a tc a nb ea t t a i n e di na n yp e r i o d . W h e nt h ep r i c ei spmax,r a t i o n a l
traders must expect the next period’s return to be zero or negative. Naive traders,
by assumption, expect it to be zero. Agents’ expected returns in the constant price
equilibrium are at least as optimistic as this; furthermore, agents in the constant-price
equilibrium expect zero volatility. So if the price is pmax,s t o c k sc a n n o to ﬀer a more
attractive return distribution to either type of agent than in the constant-price equi-
librium. But then no agent will ever be willing to pay more than the price in that
equilibrium, which is p; hence, pmax ≤ p.
We now consider equilibria in which there are two possible prices in period 1: a high
p r i c et h a ti sc l o s et ot h ep r i o rp e r i o d ’ sp r i c ea n dal o w e r“ c r a s h ”p r i c et h a to c c u r sw i t h
some small probability. A crash has two eﬀects. It raises rational traders’ demand
for stock since a lower stock price implies a higher dividend yield. However, it also
lowers naive trader stock demand if their prediction of future volatility puts enough
weight on past volatility (i.e., if α is high enough). If this volatility feedback eﬀect is
suﬃciently strong, stock demand can be upward sloping. In this case, there can be
multiple market-clearing prices.
The following Proposition gives two alternative conditions that guarantee this. The
ﬁrst is that margin constraints be strict enough that rational traders alone cannot pur-
chase all the stock and that naive traders’ beliefs be suﬃciently sensitive to realized
volatility. The second, alternative condition is that there exist any equilibrium other
than the constant-price equilibrium. If either condition holds, then crashes can occur,
in the following sense. For any suﬃciently small ε>0 there is an equilibrium in which
(a) the period-0 price is close to the variance-free price; (b) with probability 1 − ε the
period-1 price is also close to the variance-free price; (c) with probability ε the period-
171 price is below and not close to the variance-free price. As the crash probability ε
shrinks to zero, the period-0 price and the noncrash price in period 1 converge to the
variance-free price, p, while the period-1 crash price converges to a level that is strictly
below the variance-free price.
Proposition 4 The following properties hold generically. Fix δ>0, λ>0, σ2
δ > 0,
μ ∈ (0,1),a n dr>0, such that the variance-free price p =( δ−λσ2
δ)/r is positive. Then
if either
1. rational traders cannot buy all the stock (μκ < 1)a n dn a i v et r a d e r sa r es u ﬃciently
sensitive to past price volatility (α>α ∗ for some α∗ < ∞), or
2. there exists any equilibrium other than the constant-price equilibrium
then:
1. there is an ε>0 such that for any ε ∈ (0,ε) there are prices p0, pL
1,a n dpH
1 ,s u c h
that the following is an equilibrium:
(a) the period 0 price equals p0,a n d
(b) the period 1 price equals pL
1 with probability ε and pH
1 with probability 1 − ε;
2. as ε → 0, p0 and pH
1 both converge to p,b u tpL
1 converges to a price that is strictly
lower than p.
By Proposition 4, infrequent crashes are the easiest type of price uncertainty to sustain
in this model. An intuition is that if the crash is unlikely, then it has little eﬀect on
rational traders’ stock demand in period 0. Hence, the period-0 price will be very
c l o s et oi t sm a x i m u mp o s s i b l ev a l u eo fp. This maximizes naive traders’ prediction of
future volatility, α(p0 − p1)
2, at any given crash price. Hence, the volatility feedback
eﬀect is greatest when crashes are rare, which maximizes the chance that there exists a
market-clearing crash price.
18We now study how the exogenous parameters of the model aﬀect whether or not
crashes can occur in equilibrium.11 The following proposition shows that equilibria
with crashes are easier to sustain when naive traders are either more numerous or more
sensitive to past price volatility, or the margin constraint is tighter. Each of these has
the eﬀect of magnifying the importance of the volatility-feedback eﬀect. The margin
constraint does this since it limits the increase in the demand of rational traders in a
crash.
Proposition 5 Each of the following expands the set of other parameters for which
there exist equilibria with rare crashes.
1. An increase in α, the sensitivity of naive traders to past price volatility.
2. A decrease (tightening) of κ, the margin constraint.
3. A decrease in μ, the proportion of rational traders.
The third result is consistent with the fact, cited above, that the 1929 and 1987 crashes
occurred after sustained bull markets that drew many novice investors into the stock
market.
5.1 Simulations
A simulation appears in Figure 3. The chart shows excess demand (demand minus
supply) for stocks in period 1. The horizontal axis shows the ratio p1/p0 and the
vertical axis gives excess demand. Each curve shows not excess demand per investor
but rather excess demand for the group as a whole. Hence, the two dashed curves
11We do not study the eﬀects of exogenous parameters on crash sizes and probabilities, since these
are not uniquely determined: when a crash is possible, there must exist multiple crash equilibria, each
with its own crash size and probability (Proposition 4). In addition, the eﬀects of model parameters
on, say, the maximum possible crash size or probability are generally not monotonic, making it hard
to derive useful empirical implications. We also do not study the eﬀects of changes in risk aversion
or dividend risk on the equilibrium set since these eﬀects are likely to depend on the assumptions of
exponential utility and normally distributed dividends.
19Excess Demand in Period 1









































































Figure 3: Example with margin constraints. The curves show excess demand for stock
among rational traders (long dashes), naive traders (short dashes), and all traders (solid).
The horizontal axis is p1/p0.P a r a m e t e r s a r e α =0 .1, μ =0 .6, δ =1 .25, λ = σ2
δ =1 ,
r =1 % ,a n dκ =1 .5.
(excess demand of naive and rational traders) add up to the solid curve (total excess
demand). Equilibrium in period 1 requires that total excess demand (the solid curve)
be zero.12
In this simulation, Naive traders’ update sensitivity is moderate (α =0 .1)a n da
majority (60%) of traders are rational. Despite this, there is a small but positive
chance that prices will fall by 23% in period 1. Substantial crashes can occur even
though rational traders as a group can buy almost all (μκ =0 .9 units, or 90%) of the
stock.
Without margin constraints (κ = ∞), Proposition 4 does not guarantee that crashes
12The chart depicts the limiting case in which the crash risk goes to zero. It is approximately correct
when the crash risk is small but nonzero.
20Excess Demand in Period 1











































































Figure 4: Example without margin constraints. Parameters are α =0 .3, μ =0 .2,
δ =1 .15, λ = σ2
δ =1 ,a n dr =1 % .
can occur since the rational traders can purchase all the stock. However, simulations
show that crashes can occur if naive traders are suﬃciently numerous and put high
enough weight on recent volatility in updating their beliefs. An example in which this
weight, α,e q u a l s0.3 and 80% of traders are naive appears in Figure 4. Since excess
demand crosses the zero axis in two places for these parameters, crashes can be either
large (about 18% of the precrash price) or small (about 9%).
Without margin constraints, the proportion of naive traders must be fairly high
to sustain crashes – in these simulations, 80%. The reason is that rational traders’
demand rises in a crash. For there to be multiple market-clearing prices in period one,
the reduced demand of naive traders in a crash must have the potential to oﬀset the
greater demand of rational traders. This holds only if there are relatively many naive
traders in the market.
216D i s c u s s i o n
In the model presented here, rational traders collectively cause a crash by making limit
orders that correspond to a lower point on their (ﬁxed) demand curves: they bid a lower
price, but for a larger quantity of stock. This makes them net buyers of stock on the
day of the crash. In Frankel [19], we study an inﬁnite horizon, overlapping generations
version of the model presented here. In that model, rational traders actually lower their
entire demand curves for stock and become net sellers of stock on the crash day. This
occurs because we now permit trading after the crash, unlike in the original model. On
the day after the crash, naive traders sell their shares en masse. This causes prices to
continue to fall, though by far less than on the crash day. Thus, the market actually
reaches its lowest point the day after the crash. Anticipating this, rational traders have
an incentive to sell on the crash day.13
The analysis in Frankel [19] indicates that naive traders make two mistakes that
cause them to sell after the crash. First, they do not take into account that, due to risk
aversion, expected returns are higher when volatility is high. Instead, they continue
to believe after the crash that prices follow a random walk - neither rising nor falling
on average. In Frankel [19] we show that this mistake is not essential: crashes can
occur even if naive traders take into account the empirical relation between volatility
and expected returns. The reason is that, empirically, this relation is not very strong.
Naive traders also overestimate postcrash volatility. This error is essential: if naive
traders correctly predict the variance of future returns, crashes cannot occur. However,
this error is plausible. First, we show that traders who used adaptive expectations to
predict future volatility following the 1987 crash would have made this mistake. More
generally, the GARCH model overpredicts the persistence of large shocks to volatility
(see, e.g., Longin [36]). In addition, the 1987 crash did lead to a large and permanent
increase in the market’s assessment of the likelihood of future crashes (Jackwerth and
Rubinstein [29])
13In the extension, naive traders react to increased volatility with a lag. This allows them to be net
buyers of stock on the crash day and net sellers the next day.
227C o n c l u s i o n
From time to time, stock indices have jumped by several percentage points in a single
day. These jumps tend to be negative and they do not appear to be driven by public
news about fundamentals. While these jumps are infrequent, evidence from derivatives
markets suggests that their anticipation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on asset prices. By ex-
tension, these "crash fears" may raise the cost of corporate capital and depress economic
growth.
For these reasons, it is important to understand the mechanisms that underlie crashes.
The existing literature has revealed many mechanisms that help us understand markets
for risky assets. However, most models lack one or more of the essential features of
crashes. Some models give skewed returns but require large fundamental shocks to gen-
erate crashes. Others yield news-free jumps but symmetric returns. In the few models
that do exhibit both phenomena, the negative skew is due to special assumptions of the
model that can be plausibly reversed, yielding positive skew. This paper presents a
theory that does not appear to have this weakness. Positive skew can be generated by
assuming that investors are risk-loving, but this is not plausible.
The basic idea of our theory is that some investors are naive: rather than taking
into account the strategic behavior of other agents, they believe that stock prices follow
a random walk with serially correlated volatility. This belief is approximately true in
an empirical sense and was the mainstream view in the ﬁnance community for decades.
In this simple model, we show that prices cannot exceed fundamentals but they can
suddenly fall signiﬁcantly below fundamentals. Simulations show that this can occur
with reasonable updating by naive traders. Moreover, with mild margin constraints,
naive traders can also constitute a minority of investors in the market.
23AP r o o f s






















































































































2 − λ(μ − (1 + r)p)x − λW(1 + r)
¸
(10)











where f(x)=4 abx −2a−b2 −4a2x2. f(x) is concave in x so its ﬁrst derivative is zero
at a maximum of f. One can verify that f0 =0only at x = b/2a. At this value of x,
f(x)=4 ab b
2a − 2a − b2 − 4a2 ¡
b
2a
¢2 = −2a. T h i si sn e g a t i v es i n c ea = λ2σ2
2 > 0.S o
f(x) is always negative: (10) is globally concave.
Consequently, (10) has a unique maximum given by x = b/2a =
μ−(1+r)p
λσ2 = x∗.I f
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2 − λ(μ − (1 + r)p)κ − λW(1 + r)
¸
Q.E.D.Lemma 1
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . By deﬁnition, p0 = p1 in a constant-price equilibrium. By




















If the rational traders’ margin constraint binds in period 1, then the naive traders’
margin constraint cannot bind, so by (11),















but this is a contradiction: if p1 >D , then by (6) and (7), the rational traders’ uncon-
strained demand is less than the naive traders’ unconstrained demand. An analogous
argument implies that naive traders’ margin constraint cannot bind. Since neither







We now consider period 0. Since p1 is known to equal D,r a t i o n a lt r a d e r s ’d e m a n d
equals xR






























25By an analogous argument to the case of period 1, one can show that neither margin
constraint binds; give this, p0 = D is the only solution to (12). Q.E.D.Proposition 2
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by (5), xR
1 > 1.H o w e v e r , b y ( 6 ) ,
x
R
1 =m i n
½
κ,






D + δ − (1 + r)p1
λσ2
δ









a contradiction. Now suppose p0 > p.S i n c e p1 ≤ p, rational trader demand is maxi-
mized by the belief that p1 = p. Hence, by Lemma 1, rational traders’ unconstrained
demand is at most
p+δ−(1+r)p0
λ(1+r)σ2
δ .S i n c e p0 > p,t h i si sl e s st h a n
δ−rp0
λ(1+r)σ2
δ, which is an upper
bound on naive traders’ demand. Hence, total demand is less than
δ−rp0
λ(1+r)σ2
δ.S i n c e








–a contradiction. Q.E.D.Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 4: We cannot explicitly compute rational agents’ demands in
period 0 in this case, since returns are not normally distributed. We will overcome this
by using instead their period-0 demand for the case in which they expect the price in
period 1 to equal the variance-free price for sure. Under this assumption, there can be
two market clearing prices in period 1: the variance-free price and a lower price, which
is unanticipated in period 0. We will then show that there is continuity: for any small
probability ε, there is an equilibrium in which the price is close to the lower price in
period 1 with probability ε and close to the variance-free price with probablity 1 − ε.
If rational traders expect the price in period 1 to be the variance-free price, their



























26But this is just equation (12), whose only solution was shown to be p0 = p:t h e
variance-free price clears the market in period 0 as well.
Now suppose that traders reach period 1 after observing p0 = p. By (5), (6), and
















One solution to this equation is p1 = p. When is there a lower market clearing price?
As p1 falls below p,b o t hn u m e r a t o r si n( 1 4 )r i s et oﬁrst order. The denominator of the
naive traders’ demand is unchanged to ﬁrst order but rises to second order. Hence, for
p1 less than but arbitrarily close enough to p, the left hand side exceeds 1. However, if
α is large enough, we can guarantee that as p1 continues to fall, naive traders’ demand
will begin to shrink. Indeed, by taking α arbitrarily large, we can ensure that naive
traders’ unconstrained demand shrinks to zero arbitrarily quickly as p1 < p falls. Since
by assumption the rational traders cannot buy all the stock, there must exist an α∗ such
that if α>α ∗, then there is another market clearing price p1 that is strictly less than p.
Thus, for any suﬃciently high α there is an equilibrium in which p0 = p1 = p for
sure but there also exists another price p0
1, strictly lower than p, that would also clear
the market in period 1.
We now prove that for any small enough crash risk ε>0, there are equilibria that
are close to this equilibrium. There are ﬁve variables: the crash probability, ε;r a t i o n a l
traders’ unconstrained demand in period 0, xR∗
0 ; the period 0 price p0; the low period 1
price, pL
1; the high period 1 price pH
1 . The equations for an equilibrium are as follows.
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For generic parameters, the functions fn are continuously diﬀerentiable in a neighbor-
hood of this solution, since diﬀerentiability fails only when one of the following non-
generic conditions holds: xR∗
0 = κ,o re i t h e r
D−p+δ−rp
λσ2
δ = κ or
δ−rp
λ(α(p−p0)2+σ2
δ) = κ for
p = pL
1 or pH
1 . In addition,
det
⎡
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is generically nonzero. By the Implicit Function Theorem, there is a neighborhood N of




1 (ε), such that (ε,xR
0 (ε),p 0(ε),p L
1(ε),p H
1 (ε)) solve the system of equations
(and thus constitute an equilibrium). The claim follows.
We now show that if there is an equilibrium with a nonconstant price, then there
are equilibria with occasional crashes. The nonconstant price must occur in period 1,
28since there is no way for rational traders to randomize in a coordinated way in period
0. We ﬁrst show that there must be a positive probability that p1 will take a value
p
1 <p 0. Otherwise, rational traders in period 0 would know that the price could not
fall in period 1. A lower bound on their demand would thus be their demand under the








by Lemma 1. Since this is also the expression for naive demand,
neither group’s margin constraint could bind. Accordingly, rational and naive trader
demand in period 0 would both equal
δ−rp0
λ(1+r)σ2
δ. Since this is a lower bound on actual
market demand, it must be no greater than market supply, 1
1+r;s o l v i n g ,w eﬁnd p0 ≥ p.
But no price can exceed p by Proposition 3. Since by hypothesis the period 1 price
is never below the period 0 price, it must be that p0 = p1 = p, which contradicts the
assumption that p1 is not constant.
This shows that there must be a price p
1 that is strictly below p0 and that occurs
with positive probability. Market clearing in period 1 requires that μmin{κ,xR∗
1 }+(1−
μ)min{κ,xN∗


















 is unconstrained naive trader demand. Since p
1 <p 0 ≤ p,
one can show easily that xN∗
1 <x R∗
1 , so the margin constraint does not bind for naive
t r a d e r si np e r i o d1 .
Now consider what would happen if the period-0 price were increased to the variance-
free price p. This would increase the denominator of xN∗
1 ,l o w e r i n gm a r k e td e m a n di n
period 1 at the price p
1. Hence, market demand at p1 = p
1 would be strictly less than
one. Market demand at p1 = p would equal one by Proposition 2. Moreover, for
p1 slightly less than p, market demand would strictly exceed one, since (a) the margin
constraint cannot bind when both prices equal p and (b) the eﬀect on the denominator
of xN∗
1 is zero to ﬁrst order while the numerators of xR∗
1 and xN∗
1 both rise to ﬁrst order.
Hence, if the period 0 price were to equal p,t h e nb o t hp1 = p and a price strictly below
p would clear the market in period 1. One can now show that there exist equilibria with
rare crashes using the implicit function theorem as shown above. Q.E.D.Proposition 4
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : Equilibria with rare crashes exist if there are market-clearing
29prices strictly below p in period 1 following a period 0 price of p.E a c h s u c h p1 must
satisfy μmin{κ,xR∗
1 }+(1−μ)min{κ,xN∗









δ) is unconstrained naive trader demand.
As p1 begins to fall below p, both unconstrained demands rise to ﬁrst order; for a
lower price to clear the market, eventually the second order term α(p1 − p)
2 in the
denominator of xN∗
1 must dominate the ﬁrst order eﬀect. By raising this second order
term, an increase in α will expand the range of other parameters where equilibria with
rare crashes exist. Since xR∗
1 exceeds xN∗
1 for all p1 < p, a decrease in either κ or μ will
lower market demand and thus also expand this range. Q.E.D.Proposition 5
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